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Abstract: 
It has often been noted that French politicians frequently hold local and national offices 
concurrently. Traditionally, this phenomenon is explained by the political culture (a 
patriarchal conception of authority), the territorial centralization and the weakness of party 
organizations that characterize France. In order to test the latter two hypotheses, we propose 
analysing the practise of the cumul des mandats at the level of individual parliamentarians. In 
this way we circumvent the classic n=1 problem without engaging in a comparison with other 
countries. Based on a logit analysis with the dependent variable equal to the number of local 
offices held by the members of the National Assembly under the present term (XIIe 
législature), the study partially confirms our hypotheses. Other variables, such as age and 
gender, are also considered. 
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Introduction 
 
An oft noted specificity of French politics is the accumulation of mandates and offices held 
concurrently by most politicians (Knapp, 2004)1. This practice, known in French as “cumul 
des mandats”, is an enduring phenomenon – it has indeed even gained momentum – though 
laws were passed with a view to limiting it. The general public also tends to reject it, as 
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illustrated by opinion polls which suggest that more than 60% of the electorate would approve 
of laws prohibiting any form of cumul2. 
Cumul des mandats has thus become a much debated issue in political and academic milieus. 
Most observers point out that this phenomenon is quite specific to France. In other countries, 
holding several mandates simultaneously is either restricted by law as in Germany, Greece or 
Italy, or alien to the political culture of the country, as in the US and the UK (Mabileau, 
1991: 17). A comparative approach to cumul des mandats across Europe based on the number 
of local offices held by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) shows that French 
MEPs are by far the most numerous group to hold both a local office and a European 
mandate. As opposed to France (43.7%) and Luxembourg (33.3%), a mere 16.8% of all the 
MEPs hold local offices, and the gap between France and Luxembourg is significantly more 
than 10 points (see appendix I). 
There are in fact several types of cumul in which French politicians engage when they 
combine mandates and offices. Since there is no limitation to the number of mandates that a 
politician may hold in his or her lifetime, political careers are frequently very long as 
incumbents are often re-elected several times until they retire at an advanced age. However, 
the concept of cumul des mandats usually refers to the multiple mandates held simultaneously 
by political actors who have responsibilities outside the world of politics proper – in trade 
unions or professional organizations, for instance –, work in the public or private sector, or 
hold national or local non-elected executive positions (CREAM, 1998). But the most 
controversial dimension of cumul is the simultaneous accumulation of local elected offices 
held by national representatives, i.e. members of the National Assembly (MPs). Indeed it is 
not uncommon, that the mayors of the principle municipalities of a circonscription 
(constituency) successively occupy the same seat in parliament. This is especially the case in 
the 16th circonscription of Bouches-du-Rhône where three mayors were elected in the last 
three legislatures: the mayor of Tarascon (the gaullist Thérèse Aillaud 1993-1997), of Arles 
(the socialist Michel Vauzelle 1997-2002) and of Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer (the UMP Roland 
Chassain since 2002). In the present study, we will focus on why MPs from the XIIe 
législature (starting in 2002) engage in a cumul des mandats at the local and regional levels 
(municipalities, départements and regions), a political practice that has become widespread in 
the Fifth Republic. 
In the last two decades, several attempts were made to limit the scope of cumul des mandats. 
Two laws were voted in 1985 with a view to preventing representatives from holding 
concurrently more than one of the following mandates – Member of the European Parliament, 
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regional councillor (conseiller régional), county councillor (conseiller général), mayor of a 
town of more than 20,000 inhabitants, député-maire (MP and mayor) of a town of more than 
100,000 inhabitants3. The unexpected consequence of such regulations was an increase in 
single cumul – i.e. a national office plus a single local function. As Y. Mény puts it, “while 
the cumul was limited in terms of the number of mandates, it nevertheless became more 
widespread” (Mény, 1992: 82; see also Mabileau, 1991). The relative failure of the first set of 
regulations led to the adoption of more constraining rules. Indeed new laws were passed in 
2000 and amended in 20034. 
In concrete terms, it is impossible today in France for an elected representative to be both a 
member of the Assemblée Nationale and of the Sénat. MPs and Senators may not be MEPs 
either. They may not hold more than one of the following mandates – regional councillor, 
county councillor, councillor in the Corsican Assembly, councillor of a town of more than 
3,500 inhabitants, or councillor in Paris. But an MP can still have local executive functions 
and be a regional or county assembly president, the president of the Corsican Assembly, or a 
mayor. In theory he or she may also combine mandates as MP, county council president and 
mayor of a town of less than 3,500 inhabitants, although, in reality, this configuration does not 
exist today. Nevertheless certain individuals such as Augustin Bonrepaux are presidents of a 
conseil général (Ariège as it happens) and adjoint au maire (deputy mayor) (Ax-les-
Thermes), others, like Françoise de Panafieu or Jean Tiberi are mayors (17th and 5th 
arrondissements of Paris respectively) and members of the conseil général. 
In the literature, three opposite but non-exclusive interpretations of cumul des mandats 
prevail. According to Y. Mény, this phenomenon is the expression of a patriarchal conception 
of power in a country still dominated by the traditional image of the monarch: despite the 
French Revolution, “the traditional conception of authority tends to concentrate power in the 
hands of one alone” (Mény, 1992: 62; see also Mény, 1997). But this explanation seems to be 
partly contradicted by opinion polls (Olivier, 1998). Other specialists contend that the 
accumulation of mandates and offices is linked to the territorial organization of France, 
characterized by a strong central state (Knapp, 1991), and reflecting the dominant cursus 
honorum of politicians (Sadran, 2000). According to this theory, local mandates are often less 
an end in themselves than the point of departure necessary to a political career. Because of 
centralization, they offer only a limited perimeter of action and prestige. On the other hand, as 
they do not demand a particularly large investment for politicians elected to parliament, the 
latter have an interest in preserving the economic advantages, the insurance in the case that 
they are not re-elected at the national level and the proximity to their electorate. This, 
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however, does not suffice to explain this French specificity: other centralized states exist in 
Europe where there is not this widespread cumul. According to the third explanation, it is the 
weakness of parties that is at the origin of the widespread existence of cumul des mandats: 
this is due to the fact that in France it is those who are elected several times who make the 
party and not the inverse (Knapp, 2004; Mény, 1992). 
In this article, we propose to analyze cumul des mandats with respect to the last two 
explanations. It must be noted that these hypotheses – a highly centralized state and weak 
party organization – have never really been tested. This is due to the difficulty of comparing 
the French situation to those of other countries while addressing all the other contextual 
variables. In order to get around this difficulty (the classic n=1 problem), we have changed 
the unit of analysis to individual parliamentarians, thus gaining some variance while 
controlling for the cultural context. 
To sum up, the aim of this paper is twofold. We will first describe the scope and nature of 
cumul des mandats as practiced by the members of the National Assembly following the 2000 
and 2003 laws. We will then try and explain what factors may be instrumental in the 
persistence of such a practice. 
 
An empirical study 
 
The present study focuses on cumul des mandats as practiced by the 577 members of XIIe 
législature of the National Assembly in office at the time of writing (March 2006), that is 
MPs elected during the 2002 general election plus a few MPs elected more recently during 
by-elections. Our sample does not include the members of the higher chamber of Parliament, 
the Sénat. Indeed the raison d’être of the Sénat is partially to represent subnational territorial 
entities: senators are elected by grands électeurs (local elected representatives) and almost all 
senators hold another local mandate.  
The Right won the 2002 general legislative elections. The Assembly is thus composed of a 
majority of representatives who belong to the conservative UMP (a newly formed alliance 
between RPR and some UDF members) with 368 MPs (63.78% of the Assembly) and the 
centre-right UDF (30 MPs, 5.2%). The left wing representatives from the Socialist (PS) and 
Communist (PC) groups are respectively 149 (25.82%) and 21 (3.64%). The other 11 MPs, 
who do not belong to any parliamentary group (NI: non-inscrits), are members of the 
environmentalist party (Les Verts) (3 MPs), the centre-left PRG (2 MPs), the nationalist MPF 
(1 MP) and the right-wing liberal party (Démocratie Libérale) (1 MP). Out of the remaining 4 
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non-inscrits MPs, two co-operate with the majority UMP – they are thus considered as UMP 
members in our study - and the other two MPs who come from the overseas territory of La 
Martinique are truly non-inscrits representatives. 
It is interesting to notice that, as is the case in most parliaments in Europe, the Assembly 
remains rather gerontocratic. In 2006, MPs are 57 years old on average (the youngest MP is 
30 and the oldest one, 84). There are no significant differences between the various parties, 
except for the Communist MPs who are 11 years older (63) than the younger UDF 
representatives (52). Women MPs are slightly younger (56) than their male counterparts. 
To go deeper into gender considerations, the legislature remains strongly male-dominated: 
there are only 75 women who sit in Parliament. The Left is somewhat more feminized: 25 
Socialist MPs out of 149 (16%), 4 Communists out of 21 (19%) and 1 Green representative 
out 3 (33%) are women. As for the Right, 43 MPs are women: 42 UMP (11.4%) and 1 UDF 
(3.33%). 
These disparities have no significant impact upon cumul statistics. 89.25% of all MPs hold 
one or more additional elective offices5. Only 62 members of the National Assembly 
(10.75%) do not have any other mandate. There are strong similarities between women and 
men in matters of cumul (87% and 90% respectively), or between the UMP and the Socialist 
Party (90% against 89%). Overall, the local position most favoured by MPs is that of mayor 
(49%), followed by county councillor (13.7%) and regional councillor (9%). Finally, 14.9% 
of the MPs hold two local elective mandates simultaneously. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
MPs who hold local offices according to the type of office held and to the left-right divide 
(absolute figures are in brackets). 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, there is no significant difference between left-wing and right-wing 
parties in matters of cumul. We should nevertheless point out the fact that left-wing MPs tend 
to hold fewer local elective offices than their right-wing counterparts – on average, 1.01 
against 1.05. 
It is also noteworthy that, out of a total of 577 MPs, 531 are directly elected representatives 
and 46 (7.97%) are suppléants (deputy MPs). According to the French Constitution, deputy 
MPs (not to be confused with MPs elected on the occasion of by-elections) are elected on the 
same ticket as the main candidates, whom they replace if the latter are called to other, higher 
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positions (to become Cabinet members, in most cases). Deputy MPs are slightly younger (55 
years of age on average). Among the 46 deputy MPs in the National Assembly, 34 (73.9%) 
are men. 42 deputy MPs (92.8%) hold one or more additional elective offices and 11 (24%) 
accumulate more than one supplementary mandate. These indicators show that the profile of 
deputy MPs is rather similar to that of “ordinary” MPs. Although these figures are only 
relevant to those deputy MPs who have successfully replaced incumbents and although UMP 
is over-represented in the sample (42 deputy MPs, 92.8% of the sample), it should be noted 
that deputy MPs cannot be regarded as mere “artefacts” used by parties to improve their brand 
image or promote minor or junior members. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
As noted before, some specialists contend that weak political parties and a highly centralized 
state are the two main factors that may explain why elective offices are so often combined in 
France (Knapp, 1991). From an institutional point of view, France is indeed one of the most 
centralized countries in the EU (Colomer, 2002). Political parties, with their lack of resources 
and organizational autonomy, tend to be weak in the sense that they have a limited influence 
on the choices of individual politicians (Knapp, 2004). The combination of the two factors 
thus offers politicians opportunities to multiply electoral mandates at a sustainable political 
cost. 
Before developing the two hypotheses – a highly centralized state and weak party 
organizations – it is necessary to briefly present the reasons that may explain why MPs 
engage in a cumul des mandats. According to A. François, cumul may reduce risks stemming 
from the precariousness of political careers (François, 2002); it can increase politicians’ 
income and power, and provide the necessary financial resources for future electoral 
campaigns (François, 2006). It may also help incumbents be re-elected (Nevers, 1991; 
Foucault, 2006). But there are at least two major constraints. First, responsibilities are higher 
and the work load significantly heavier. Cumul des mandats is time consuming. It is certainly 
not an easy task to hold several elective offices at the same time. Secondly, political parties 
are theoretically opposed to cumul des mandats, for two reasons. Multiple office-holders have 
less time to devote to parliamentary activities (questions to the government, amendments) and 
they ask more from Parliament (state subsidies for the towns or regions they represent, special 
attention to local issues) (Mény, 1992). Moreover the general public does not approve of 
cumul des mandats (Olivier 1998). In all logic, there is a definite risk that parties could thus 
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lose votes if they endorsed “cumul candidates”. We therefore make the assumption that, 
ceteris paribus, even if a politician decides to run for several elections concurrently, he will 
meet strong resistance and opposition from his or her own party. 
However, the constraints and political cost attached to holding several elective offices 
simultaneously are weaker in France than in any other country. Highly centralized institutions 
imply less work and responsibilities at the local level. As local authorities largely depend on 
decisions made by central institutions, a representative will have more room for manoeuvre in 
his daily political activities in a département or municipality if he or she seats in Parliament 
and thus has access to the higher decision-making body. Besides, the generally weak internal 
organization of parties means that individual parliamentarians can more easily influence the 
choice of their party’s candidate in a given constituency. French parties can be qualified as 
weak insofar as they do not possess true organisational autonomy, which is however, one of 
the fundamental characteristics of any political party (Seiler, 2000). To be precise, the internal 
division of power between the elected officials and the rest of the party apparatus (party 
members and administration) is particularly favourable to the former. The material and 
financial resources belonging to the party are limited: there are very few party members, there 
is a cap on donations from individuals and those from private enterprises are prohibited by the 
law and party organizations are not backed by powerful structures on the periphery (unions or 
foundations) as is often the case elsewhere in Europe6. Faced with this lack of resources in 
party organizations, elected officials enjoy a margin of manoeuvre to the extent that the public 
financing of parties is linked to the results of legislative elections and locally elected 
representatives have resources associated with the exercise of a local mandate (i.e. financial 
compensation, and in the case of a mayor his staff, municipal offices and communication 
services). Neither the local party authorities (consisting of a few members or clients), nor the 
national authorities (lacking resources and the ability to sanction) are then able to dissuade a 
local elected official from running for office in a legislative election: there are so little 
inclined to do so that they themselves belong to the club of elected representatives. 
For lack of a comparison with other European countries, our demonstration concentrates on 
the variability of the individual situations of French parliamentarians. Indeed the overall 
picture drawn up does not prevent the distribution of power and modes of organization unique 
to each party. To a certain extent, one can argue that not all territorial collectivities have the 
same degree of dependence on the center. In other words, our hypotheses can be tested if we 
relate the political cost of holding multiple mandates to three factors which vary at the 
individual level – party strength, various types of local offices and the different 
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responsibilities attached to the positions held. We can formulate four hypotheses relating to 
the relationship between party and individual politicians and two hypotheses relative to the 
material cost of cumul. 
First, the likelihood that an MP may hold several mandates depends on his or her party 
organization. Though French political parties are weak as a rule, some are weaker than others. 
We will hypothesize that the politicians of the weakest parties (that is to say those that have a 
minimal organizational autonomy) enjoy a larger margin of individual manoeuvre and thus 
tend to have more mandates. 
Secondly, a politician is more likely to hold several offices if he or she is firmly established in 
a region. This relates to the issue of local power. In his or her dealings with the party, a well-
established politician, who is known to the militants and has a good grasp of the local 
environment, can more easily be a multiple office candidate. Strictly speaking, we should 
distinguish here between different types of political trajectory or cursus honorum (Sellier, 
1984). According to this idea, the practice of cumul does not have the same logic depending 
on whether it is practised in an ascending or a descending manner: an MP who previously 
held a local mandate has neither the same difficulties to be elected nor the same political goals 
as an MP who obtained a local mandate after his national one. The most striking difference is 
the influence of the party on the career of the politicians. The party will a priori have a greater 
influence in the first case. Nevertheless, the large majority of MPs have an ascending cumul: 
83% of them have one or more local mandates before being elected as an MP. Following the 
careers of actual MPs, we establish that 86% of cumulating MPs (“cumulards”) have an 
ascending cursus honorum and that individuals who were mayors before becoming MPs, like 
the highly visible mayor-MP of Bègles, Noël Mamère, are three times more numerous than 
those who were first parliamentarians. 
Thirdly, members of party executive committees tend to hold more offices. As for any party 
member, there is a conflict of interest between the official positions defended by the party and 
the defense of their personal interests. But contrary to the rank and file members, party leaders 
are in a stronger position to defend their own positions: they possess the resources, 
information and the notoriety associated with their position in the party. They are therefore 
less likely to meet internal opposition when they choose to be candidates more than one time. 
Fourthly, a single member type of election favours cumul more than a list system. The choice 
of a candidate is, by definition, very important in matters of cumul, because it is the moment 
when the party decides whether or not it will support a candidate who already holds an elected 
mandate. Once again, the issue hinges on the balance between the party as an institution and 
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the politician as an individual, which partly depends on the electoral system. Arguably, in a 
list system, voting is much more about ideological or partisan considerations than about the 
candidates’ supposed personal qualities: individual candidates are diluted in a list system. The 
role of the party is much more significant in the case of a list system than in a single member 
election. If the party proves to be too authoritarian, there is a definite risk that a well-
established incumbent might run as an independent candidate and win against the party’s 
official nominee. Conversely, the bargaining power of an individual candidate is much 
weaker in the case of a list system, because he or she may find it difficult to put up a 
competing list. 
These four hypotheses illustrate the relationship between parties and individual politicians, 
which obviously influences the choice of the candidates. 
We should also address the problem of the costs attached to the responsibilities and tasks 
assumed. We therefore propose two other hypotheses. 
First, parliamentarians from more independent regions tend not to hold local offices. As 
explained before, it is generally easier to hold several elected offices in France than anywhere 
else because institutional centralization decreases the responsibilities of local office-holders. 
But some MPs come from more independent and distant constituencies and regions. We 
contend that, in these regions, local mandates demand more direct involvement from the 
persons in charge. In such regions politicians tend to relinquish their local mandates when 
they are elected to Parliament. 
Secondly, politicians tend to hold more mandates in less populated constituencies. The work 
load and responsibilities implied in the political management of a densely populated urban 
area are more significant than in low density rural areas. Parliamentarians are thus more likely 
to keep their local mandates in rural areas. 
We have thus tentatively shown that party weakness and territorial centralization may account 
for the prevalence of cumul des mandats in France. In the next part, we propose to test these 
explanations according to the six specific hypotheses mentioned above. We also take into 
account two demographic variables: age and sex. 
 
Data and variables 
 
To test our hypotheses, we have used two sets of indicators – indicators related to our 
dependent variable (the different possibilities of cumul offered to MPs) and indicators that 
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make up our independent variables (socio-political indicators about parliamentarians, party 
organization and the characteristic features of the constituencies). 
 
Dependent Variable: types of cumul 
 
There are many elective functions that French parliamentarians can hold. We shall analyse 
here the three most important ones not only in quantitative terms but also their significance: 
municipal mandates (maires and conseillers municipaux), county council members (conseiller 
général) and regional council members (conseiller regional). 
Using official information available on the National Assembly website, our database consists 
of information regarding whether or not the MPs have a local mandate, and the number of 
mandates held simultaneously (two or three). There are in fact two dependent variables. The 
first (cumul) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an MP holds a local elective office and 0 if 
he or she does not. The second (cumul type) is a nominal variable scored 0 if an MP has no 
local office, 1 in the case of a municipal office, 2 if he or she is a general councillor, 3 if he or 
she is a regional councillor and 4 if he or she holds at least two local elective offices.  
 
Independent variables and associated indicators 
 
? Party organization 
The first independent variable (Party organization) establishes a classification of parties in 
terms of their degree of organizational autonomy: it aims to test the hypothesis according to 
which the weaker a party is in terms of its organizational resources the more its MPs have a 
tendency to cumulate. The extent to which central committee membership is controlled by the 
members of the “party in office” as opposed to the party rank and file members is particularly 
relevant to the question of party organization. The dichotomy originally established by 
Duverger (1951) between “mass party” and “cadre party” has lost some of its accuracy 
following the deep changes that have affected political life in Western Europe. Katz and Mair 
(1995) suggest that the cartel party has become the dominant model in contemporary politics, 
which is a relevant description of most French political parties, especially the UMP and PS, 
(Seiler, 2003). However, there are some differences in terms of party strength, membership 
and numbers of elected politicians. 
Using several indicators relative to party organization (see appendix II) as well as data from 
specialized studies, we propose a typology of party organization based on the degree of 
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control exerted by the “party in office” over party leadership. In the case of the centre-right 
parties, Haegel (2002) points out that the respective role of in-office politicians and militants 
was a very sensitive issue when a new political alliance was concluded between right-wing 
parties in 2002: the centre-right UDF members who joined the alliance strongly opposed 
giving militants a dominant position whereas the conservative RPR leaders adopted a more 
open attitude towards the rank and file members. This resulted in a compromise in the 
drafting of the new UMP alliance party statutes. Conversely, two other parties, namely the 
part of the UDF party which remained an independent parliamentary group, and the centre-
left PRG party – traditionally considered as “cadre parties” – have kept a structure which is 
much more favourably oriented towards in-office leaders. The parliamentary group leaders 
are given an ex-officio status (in the National Assembly, Senate and European Parliament) in 
their respective central committees and there are very few non-elected members in their 
executive committees7. 
The French Communist Party (PCF), considered as an ideal-type mass party during the 1950s, 
has typically retained some of its original characteristics: there are very few elected politicians 
among the party leaders and the party machinery has kept a significant role. The Green party 
sticks to its internal rule of not allowing any member to hold several mandates 
simultaneously: the leading committee of the party is only made up of non-office-holding 
politicians. 
The typology of party organization appears as an ordinal indicator, which differentiates 
between three types of political parties, according to the institutional constraints imposed on 
their elected members. The weakest parties in terms of internal organization are in the first 
group (UDF, PRG, MPF, DL and the non-inscrits representatives), then comes the group 
comprising UMP and PS, and finally the third group is made up of parties in which grass-root 
members and militants are the most influential (French Communist Party, Greens)8. We 
propose to assess the influence of these data on the propensity of politicians to accumulate 
elective mandates. 
 
? Local strongholds 
The second independent variable pertains to the local ties that may exist between a well-
established MP and his or her constituency. The hypothesis is the following one: a long-
standing parliamentarian is bound to be well-known to the electorate and thus highly likely to 
be re-elected, independently of his or her party’s support. Likewise, the more local mandates 
he or she may have held, the more legitimate he or she is to run for new elections. Political 
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experience and reputation, acquired through consecutive terms of office, lessen risks of local 
political competition. Cumul across time facilitates vertical cumul. In order to assess how 
well-established MPs may be, we have computed the number of elective mandates (data from 
the National Assembly website), held in the same local areas as their constituencies before 
they were elected for the first time in Parliament. 
 
? Party leadership 
To assess the impact of party leadership positions upon cumul, a dichotomous variable 
differentiates between MPs who are party leaders (as stated on the official website of each 
party) from those who have no specific position in their party. In the UMP party, the central 
committee is made up of the president, deputy-presidents, the treasurer, the president’s own 
political advisers, spokespersons, executive councillors, national secretaries for political 
affairs and administrative national secretaries. The leading body of the Socialist Party is 
composed of the National Secretariat and of the Project Committee. Leadership in the UDF 
party is entrusted to the president and vice-presidents, the spokesperson, the treasurer and the 
executive committee. The Greens have an executive committee of 13 members who were 
elected on the occasion of the 2005 Congress. The PRG central committee gathers together 
the president, the general delegate, the secretary general, the treasurer, the spokesperson and 
deputy-presidents. The PCF president collaborates with the National Council and the 
Executive College. 
As this stage, it should already be noted that 97 members of the National Assembly (17%) 
have a leading position in their party. There are significant differences between the parties: 
the proportion is 63% for the UDF, 14% for the UMP, and 18% for the PS. Of all the MPs 
who hold directional responsibilities in their parties, 94% (91 out of 97) also hold a local 
elected office and 9% (9 out of 97) hold two elected offices. 
 
? Devolution, Decentralization 
To test our hypothesis relative to the degree of autonomy of the various constituencies, we 
have constructed a dummy variable, which differentiates between metropolitan regions and 
the few “territories” that are endowed with a specific status. Despite the high degree of 
centralization of the French state, special rights have been granted to some regional entities – 
overseas regions in their vast majority – (Corsica, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
French Guyana, New Caledonia and La Réunion island). Corsica was a “region” but became 
an autonomous “territorial community” in 1991 (the law on 13 May 1991). The autonomous 
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status was extended after a new law was voted on 22 January 2002. Following the revision of 
the Constitution on 28 March 2003, each over-seas community was granted a specific status. 
While being more autonomous than the standard metropolitan regions, they can adapt 
legislative provisions and merge regional and county councils into a single assembly. The 
overseas territories thus offer an interesting opportunity to test whether local MPs tend to 
practice cumul des mandats on the model of metropolitan MPs. It should be noted, however, 
that the devolution indicator is strongly correlated to the geographical distance of the 
constituencies from the capital, which could be another intervening variable9.  
 
? Density 
We have also constructed a variable indicating the characteristics of the local environment, 
namely the population density in each département as measured by the French National 
Institute of Statistics (INSEE). The totality of the French territory has been taken into account, 
i.e. 100 départements, plus several overseas local authorities. Our objective is to assess the 
political cost attached to multiple office-holding according to the density of the local 
population concerned10.  
 
? Gender and age 
We have introduced the two most important control variables: gender and age. This is a 
dummy variable labelled 1 for men and 0 for women. The age variable corresponds to the age 
of each parliamentarian in early 2006. 
  
Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we propose to analyse empirically to what extent the degree of centralization 
and the organisational weakness of the parties in France may be the main factors that account 
for cumul des mandats. Our hypotheses are tested through a Logit analysis with robust 
standard errors. 
In Table 1, the dependent variable is a dummy indicator of the accumulation of local elective 
offices (cumul). Only 62 members of the National Assembly (11%) do not hold additional 
local offices. The impact of the seven independent variables on the choice to engage in cumul 
is evaluated independently of the type of local office held. The first three independent 
variables relate to the negotiation between politicians and parties (party organization, local 
 13
strongholds, and party leadership). The next two variables refer to the political cost of cumul 
(devolution and density), and the two last ones are gender and age. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Starting with the indicators relative to the assumption about the conflict of interest between 
parties and individual politicians, the first result is that the stronger an individual politician is 
locally (several local offices held in a row) the more he or she practices cumul – the 
coefficient is significant. The coefficient for the “party organization” variable, though less 
significant, confirms our findings: the stronger party organization is, the less likely a 
politician is to hold local offices. Finally, the impact of the “party leadership” variable is not 
statistically significant, but is in keeping with the initial hypothesis: party leaders are more 
often multiple office-holders than other MPs. 
In terms of political cost, only the second variable gives a statistically significant result: in the 
constituencies with high population density, parliamentarians tend to hold fewer offices. MPs 
elected in more “autonomous” territories practice cumul slightly less than in the other 
metropolitan regions, but the coefficient is not significant at all. This result suggests that the 
degree of centralization is not a cause of cumul des mandats. 
Finally, gender has no significant impact, contrary to the age variable. The older politicians 
tend to hold fewer offices than the others: the average age of office-holders is 56.3 years 
compared to 59.6 for non-office-holders. Actually, the rate of non-cumul for MPs aged 70 and 
over is much higher (43%) than in the rest of the sample (11%). We may thus propose a 
simple explanation: some older politicians are probably on their way to retirement, which 
explains why they decide to relinquish one local office. 
In general terms, the first results suggest that, although the indicators relative to party 
organization and to the positions held within the party are hardly significant from a statistical 
perspective, the stronger a politician is as an individual and the weaker his or her party is as 
an organized group, the more cumul there is. These findings also corroborate the fact that the 
political cost of cumul is globally an important factor in a politician’s decision to hold several 
electoral offices: parliamentarians elected in constituencies where the cost of cumul is higher 
(that is, where the population is more concentrated) are less likely to hold two or three 
mandates simultaneously. On the other hand, there is no evidence indicating a link between 
centralization and cumul des mandats. 
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After analysing the various factors, we should now differentiate between four types of cumul 
– the combination of a parliamentary mandate with only one municipal, county, or regional 
mandate. The fourth category includes parliamentarians who hold at least two of the 
previously-mentioned local offices. These mandates depend on the specificities of local 
elections. In municipal elections the mayor and his councillors are directly elected in each 
town and commune. It is a two-round list system vote with a strong advantage given to the 
majority in terms of seats. The election of county councillors is based on the same system, but 
each councillor is elected in a single-member district. Regional councillors are elected 
according to a proportional list system. Through the different electoral systems we can thus 
indirectly test our fourth hypothesis according to which a single-member electoral system 
tends to favour cumul, whereas the list system does not. Moreover, this analysis aims at 
determining the respective influence of each of our six independent variables according to the 
type of local mandate held. 
If we turn to the question of the impact of the electoral rule, our hypothesis is confirmed by 
the under-representation of regional councillors among MPs. 11% of parliamentarians are 
regional councillors, compared with 25% who are county councillors and 66% who are 
mayors or municipal councillors. The last figure can be explained by the fact that municipal 
offices are the most numerous in France. However the fact that MPs should hold offices at the 
county level more than at the regional level cannot be attributed to the greater number of 
county councillors compared to regional councillors (4038 and 1878 respectively). Only 3.5% 
of the regional councillors are MPs compared to 3.6% of the county councillors who are also 
MPs. Such a figure means that there is no real preference for county mandates. This result is 
all the more interesting since only 8% of MPs who are also county councillors are women, 
compared to 29% of MPs in regional councils. In Table 2, the gender variable is significant 
only in the case of MPs who are concurrently regional councillors, and it is favourable to 
women. Considering the fact that laws on gender parity were passed in France, the greater 
number of women in regional councils confirms our hypothesis that political parties play a 
more important role in the choice of candidates at the regional level. 
This last hypothesis is all the more reinforced if one establishes a distinction between a 
“descending cumul” and an “ascending cumul”. The MPs who practice a descending cumul, 
and who have even more need of support from their party in order to accumulate, are most 
common in the regional councils (21% compared to 9% in the county councils and 15% in 
municipal councils). These figures suggest that, in the regional councils where there is a list 
system, the parties tend to place their own MPs, who usually have a descending trajectory and 
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are often either women or national leaders11. On the contrary in the county councils where the 
ballot is uninominal, the trajectories are ascending and very masculine. The model that we 
have proposed, based on the conflict between party and candidate, functions much better in 
the case of ascending cumul, as is shown in Table 2. 
After analysing the direct impact of the electoral system on cumul des mandats, we propose, 
in Table 2, to assess the impact of our seven independent variables on different types of 
cumul, through a multinomial logistic regression. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Among the first three variables, it is interesting to differentiate between the variables that 
reveal a conflict of interest between parties and politicians (party organization and local 
strongholds) and those that show cooperation (party leadership). The first two variables assess 
the respective strength of parties and politicians. Together, they show the balance of power at 
work in the choice of candidates. The “cooperative variable” points to the cases in which 
parties and politicians are represented by the very same persons. 
Table 1 highlights the fact that the “conflict variables” are more predictive of cumul than the 
“cooperative variables”. Table 2 shows that the conflict variables influence county 
councillors’ election, especially in the case of two local elective offices, whereas the 
cooperative variable only influences the election of regional councillors.  
Since county elections are the only elections based on single-member districts, the decision of 
an individual politician to stand in the election is arguably easier, without or against his or her 
party’s support. There can only be one candidate for each party, and it is more difficult to find 
some form of compromise. In this configuration, the balance of power is a more decisive 
factor. When candidates run for two local elections, we suppose that parties are more opposed 
to nominating their representatives for local offices.  
In the list system (at the regional level and, to a lesser extent, at the municipal level), the 
selection of candidates is more the result of a compromise between local politicians and 
parties. It is indeed possible to find some form of consensus on who should be on the list. For 
that reason, it is not surprising that the co-operative variable should be more significant. The 
findings are less clear in the case of municipal elections. 
The findings for the two “cost-of-cumul” variables only partially confirm the impact of 
political cost in matters of cumul: they point to the expected direction for all types of local 
offices, but they are significant only with regard to population density. They also reveal a 
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cleavage between MPs who hold one local office and those who hold two. As far as the 
demographic situation of the départements is concerned, the results are statistically significant 
for MPs who hold one local office. This confirms that the choice to hold several functions 
depends on the density of the local population because local offices are difficult to hold on to 
in the more densely populated areas. MPs who hold two local offices do not seem to be 
influenced by this factor; we do not have any explanation for such a difference. 
If we turn to the socio-demographic variables, the age factor is an incentive to run for several 
offices and gender is only significant in the case of regional elections – it is favourable to 
women, as we explained above. In the other cases, there is a bias for men, but it is not a 
significant one.  
In short, our findings confirm the relationship that exists between the weakness of political 
parties and the cumul des mandats. The various types of party organization and the 
candidates’ reputation and firm establishment at the local level have a clear impact on cumul. 
This impact is stronger than the influence of the positions held within the parties. These 
variables are more significant when the electoral system is based on a list system. Finally, as 
expected, population density have a negative impact on cumul. On the other hand, 
surprisingly, the degree of centralization does not seem to influence the decisions of 
politicians. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The practice of cumul des mandats in France is massive though laws were passed with a view 
to limiting it. Nearly 90% of the members of the National Assembly hold local offices. As in 
our hypotheses, there are some obvious incentives for politicians to hold several electoral 
functions, but there are also some differentiated costs and opportunities. Generally speaking, 
the benefits outweigh the costs. 
If we consider the political costs, our analysis reveals that the age factor is a significant 
constraint for ageing parliamentarians who tend to hold fewer functions. More importantly, 
the hypotheses relative to the territorial structure of the country are not fully confirmed. The 
demographic factor plays a significant role: the political cost is lower in sparsely populated 
areas; politicians thus have more opportunities to hold several offices. But, contrary to our 
expectations, the lack of local autonomy does not lessen the cost of holding a local office for a 
parliamentarian. The absence of a statistic link between the territorial organization and cumul 
seems to contradict the existing literature. It must be recognized, however, that as the degree 
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of centralization only slightly varies in France, our study – based on an analysis at the 
individual level – only allows for an imperfect test of this hypothesis. 
Our general hypothesis based on a supposed conflict of interest between individual politicians 
who want to hold several offices, and political parties which prefer to limit the practice of 
cumul by their members is strongly confirmed. As the parties’ own resources are weak, 
politicians tend to have more power. We should also highlight the fact that this factor is more 
important at the local level, in the case of a single member voting system than in a list system. 
In the first case, each politician with a strong local position has much more power than his or 
her party. In actual fact, cumul is just as commonly practiced in a list system, but we should 
rather speak of some form of “abnormal” cumul because the multiple office-holders are 
surprisingly not those politicians who are well-established in a region, but understandably the 
party leaders or women candidates. In a list system, parties use their clout in the balance of 
power to promote gender candidates and favour their leaders. 
Ultimately, our study brings not only an empirical demonstration to the traditional thesis 
according to which the weakness of parties favour cumul des mandats in France. It also 
demonstrates that there are two distinct types of cumul according to which the direction is 
ascending or descending: the weakness of parties offers further explanation for the first case. 
It would be particularly interesting to apply this analytic model to other countries: this would 
pinpoint the effect weak parties have on cumul des mandats. It would also be an opportunity 
to verify if the absence of the impact of territorial centralization can be explained by the 
insufficiencies of our indicator or if this hypothesis ought to be definitively avoided. 
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Fig 1. Percentage and number of MPs who are multiple office-holders according to their 
political affiliation 
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Source: own calculus from data provided by the official website of the Assemblée nationale 
(accessed on 26 February 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Factors of cumul des mandats in general (whatever the local office) 
 
Logit estimates with robust standard errors 
 
|      Robust 
|      Coef.      Std. Err.    z     
 
Party organization   |    -.769*  (.457)   -1.68        
Local strongholds  |     .260***  (.070)        3.70         
Party leadership   |     .636  (.461)     1.35       
Devolution   |    -.489  (.620)   -0.72       
Density    |    -.055**  (.026)      -2.11    
Age    |    -.052***  (.018)       -2.91  
Gender   |     .235       (.393)       0.60 
Constant    |    5.031***  (1.14)           4.40 
 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
N      =     577 
LR chi2(6)      =     36.48 
Prob > chi2      =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2        =     0.0927 
Correctly classified =     89% 
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Table 2 Which local elective office is preferred 
 
Multinomial logistic regression 
 
   |   Municipal      County       Regional   Two local  
      councillors     councillors    councillors      offices 
 
Party organization     |  -.355       -1.426**   -.796  -1.361**    
     (.476)         (.584)        (.667)    (.575) 
Local strongholds    |   .230***       .363***    .074      .371***    
     (.073)         (.085)        (.100)             (.084) 
Party leadership     |   .661           .538     1.562***     -.088 
     (.491)         (.577)        (.567)   (.575) 
Devolution     |  -.517          -.473   -.043    -1.088   
     (.702)         (.839)        (.883)             (.978) 
Density      |         -.099***      -.126*   -.307**      .047    
     (.033)         (.065)        (.146)   (.030) 
Gender     |          .278            .695  -1.026**   .831 
           (.415)          (.577)        (.491)  (.559) 
Age      |         -.049***      -.061**     -.055*  -.056** 
     (.018)          (.023)       (.025)         (.022) 
Constant      |        4.016***     3.563**  4.324*** 3.026*** 
    (1.187)       (1.468)  (1.564) (1.448) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Number of obs =        577 
LR chi2(24)  =     127.77 
Prob > chi2  =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2  =     0.0816 
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Appendix I. Local offices held by Members of the European Parliament in 2003 
 
Country No local office One or more local office N 
France 49 (56.3%) 38 (43.7%) 87 
Luxembourg 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 6 
Belgium 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 25 
Ireland 12 (80%) 3 (20%) 15 
Italy 70 (80.5%) 17 (19.5%) 87 
Austria 17 (80.9%) 4 (19.1%) 21 
Finland 13 (81.3%) 3 (18.7%) 16 
Sweden 18 (81.8%) 4 (18.2%) 22 
Germany 85 (85.9%) 14 (14.1%) 99 
Portugal 22 (88%) 3 (12%) 25 
Greece 23 (92%) 2 (8%) 25 
Netherlands 29 (93.5%) 2 (6.5%) 31 
Spain 60 (93.8%) 4 (6.2%) 64 
United Kingdom 83 (95.4%) 4 (4.6%) 87 
Denmark 16 (100%) 0 (0%) 16 
All 521 (83.2%) 105 (16.8%) 626 
 
Source: own calculus based on data provided by the European Parliament (Vade Mecum of the 
European Parliament, Luxembourg, European Parliament, 2003) 
 
 
Appendix II. Indicators and data used to establish the typology of French parties according to 
their organization 
 
 Parliamentarians 
(MPs, senators, 
MEPs) in party 
leadership 
% of unelected 
politicians in party 
leadership 
Office holders 
have a specific 
representation in 
the party 
leadership 
Candidate 
selection for 
legislative 
elections according 
to party status 
Membership/score 
at 1999 European 
election 
UDF 81% (N = 48) 4% Yes By party 
leadership 
4,838 
 
UMP 73% (N = 86) 6% Yes By party 
leadership 
11,718 
 
PS 65% (N = 54) 13% No By party members 5,454 
 
PCF 9% (N = 55) 55% No By party 
committee  
22,058 
 
Verts 0% (N = 13) 100% No By party 
committee  
360 
 
Source : official websites of the political parties (accessed on 21 February 2006), Hermet et 
al. (1998) for membership data and Ministère de l’Intérieur website for the 1999 European 
election results. 
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1 We would like to thank André Blais, Martial Foucault, Abel François, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot and two 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
2 According to a survey conducted by IPSOS for France Soir (10-11 March 2000), 61% of those interviewed 
were in favour of prohibiting cumul des mandats. The score was slightly higher among the sympathisers of the 
left (64%) than those of the right (57%). Only 4% of the sample (920 individuals) did not answer. 
3 Loi organique n° 85-1405 and loi ordinaire n° 85-1406 modifying the Electoral Code, adopted on 30 December 
1985. 
4 Loi organique n° 2000-294 and loi ordinaire n° 2000-295 adopted on 5 April 2000, and loi n° 2003-327 
adopted on 11 April 2003. 
5 It is useful to remember that this percentage is not very different than those of previous legislatures. In 1978, it 
was 77%, in 1988 88% and in 1997 92% (Knapp, 2004: 8).  
6 In France, only 2% of those interviewed in the European Values Survey admitted belonging to a political party 
while for the entirety of the 32 European countries concerned by this investigation, the average is 4.3% (Halman, 
2001: 22). Similarly, only 0.7% of French respondents admitted participating in voluntary work for a political 
party compared to 1.9% for the entirety. Thus, as much for party membership as volunteer work, France is the 
second last EU-15 country just ahead of Portugal. 
7 On the UDF party, see D. Hanley (1999). 
8 In a comparative review of urban political parties, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998) has shown that there was a 
correlation between the strength of party organization and the degree of partisanship in municipal politics. The 
index used, SPOIX (Strong Party Organization Index), corroborates our findings on the organization of political 
parties in France. 
9 An indicator measuring only the distance between the locality of the elected representative and parliament has 
been tested, but it did not yield any significant results. We did not retain it because of its strong correlation with 
the devolution variable.  
10 One might think that using the département as the only territorial scale is not relevant for municipal or 
regional mandates. Actually, the regional councillors are elected at the departemental level and represent their 
département. As for municipal representatives, the departemental scale serves to indicate the concentration of 
metropolitan zones in which one would suppose the work of a representative is undertaken.  
11 Among the « cumulards » 1 woman in 5 practices a descending cumul, whereas it is only 1 man in 8. Among 
women, the most well known is Ségolène Royal, first elected as MP in 1988, then regional councillor in 1992. 
Similarly, 1 leader in 5 practice descending cumul, compared 1 in 8 for the others. 
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